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Introduction
The issue of fi scal decentralization in the 
context of the fi scal autonomy of local self-
governments is still current. The Czech Republic 
is among the countries with lower tax autonomy 
(Blöchliger & Pinero Campos, 2011; OECD, 
2016; Sedmihradská, 2015). The revenue from 
assigned taxes and from subsidy programs 
makes up decisive share in municipal budgets. 
The state specifi es the percentage of revenue 
for this type of tax that belongs to a specifi c 
part of the budget system (in the case of the 
Czech Republic i.e. regions and municipalities). 
In terms of a fl exible response, this method 
of funding does not give municipalities 
much possibility, as they may infl uence the 
amount of such revenues only through their 
interventions to a very small extent. In addition, 
non-guaranteed access to subsidies brings 
a certain uncertainty and hinders the possibility 
of revenue prediction for the nearest period 
(Janoušková & Sobotovičová, 2016a).
One of the stable revenues of municipalities 
is a tax on immovable property (formerly real 
estate tax) fl owing into municipal budgets in 
most EU countries. Thus, the principle of benefi t 
(Keith & McCluskey, 2004; Mrkývka, 2003) 
and the principle of subsidiarity are fulfi lled, 
where decision-making and responsibility in 
public affairs takes place at the lowest level 
of public administration being closest to the 
citizens. Municipalities have the option to 
adjust the structural elements of the tax, and 
they can then manage their revenues. These 
taxes are revenue stable (Birch & Sunderman, 
2013; Bečica, 2014), and they do not have 
a distortion effect on work, as well as they 
do not hamper the economic activity to such 
an extent as the income taxes, which directly 
cut back the yield from a work activity. They 
should lead the owners of immovable property 
to a more rational and more effective property 
management. However, political representation 
often shies away from these tax increases in 
the context of the potential number of votes 
(Bird, 2010).
The tax on immovable property is one 
of the basic tools of fi scal decentralization. 
Fiscal decentralization in theory is associated 
in particular with the effi ciency of allocation 
of funds to secure public goods within the 
public sector. It is related to the discussion 
of the strengthening of the role of local self-
governments, especially, the powers of decision-
making and responsibilities of municipalities 
in the economic fi eld. Decentralization allows 
for a greater public involvement in decision-
making and brings even greater transparency 
and effi ciency in the use of fi nancial resources 
(Tiebout, 1956; Bish & Kirk, 1974). Local self-
governments can use the tax on immovable 
property to infl uence the revenues of their own 
budgets in favour of improving the quality of life 
in the place of tax collection (Haider-Markel, 
2014; Marková, 2007; Bird, 2011; Roubínek 
et. al., 2015).
In the context of the economic 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
in the 1990s, the extreme centralization has 
been overcome, moreover the ways of the 
gradual decentralization and strengthening of 
the autonomy of municipalities are searched 
for, which should lead to the effi ciency of public 
services (Tanzi, 1991). Authors, such as Smith et 
al. (2011) are investigating the local perception 
of progress towards fi scal decentralization in 
the context of the transformation of the Czech 
economy in the 1990s. Transitive economies 
(Bryson, 2010) confronted the problem of the 
reconstructing of the self-government, the 
defi nition of competencies in selecting the 
sources of their fi nancing or by providing for 
their self-suffi ciency in acquiring revenues. 
In the context of the taxation of immovable 
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property, it is possible to keep track of more 
different approaches and empirical studies. 
Property valuation for purposes of determining 
the tax base of the real estate is often a hot 
topic (Horne & Felsenstein, 2010; Presbitero, 
Sacchi, & Zazzaro, 2014). Moreover, the Czech 
Republic is criticized for its unit approach in 
the determination of the tax base and a lack 
of coherence on the fair value of the real 
estate (OECD, 2010; OECD, 2011; European 
Commission, 2015). The Czech Republic is 
also recommended an increase in this tax 
revenue, as it accounts for a small proportion of 
the total tax revenues in comparison with other 
EU countries. Coombs, Sarafoglou and Crosby 
(2012) dealt with the possibility of using the 
taxation of immovable property in connection 
with a potential increase in the revenue for 
municipal budgets.
1. Taxation of Immovable Property in 
the Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, the tax revenue on 
immovable property fl ows into the budget 
of the municipality on whose territory the 
immovable property is located. Tax rates, are 
set by law and their amount is the same for all 
municipalities. A municipality may affect the 
amount of the revenue, in particular by means 
of the coeffi cients, which it determines generally 
by a binding public notice. This is a corrective 
coeffi cient based on the number of inhabitants, 
the municipal and local coeffi cient (Janoušková 
& Sobotovičová, 2016b).
The corrective coeffi cient depends on the 
number of inhabitants in the municipality. The 
municipality has the possibility to affect the 
amount of the coeffi cient by reducing it for 
individual parts of the municipality by one to 
three categories or increase it by one category. 
The coeffi cient is applied to residential 
buildings and their appurtenances and units. 
The corrective coeffi cient is also applied to 
construction sites and due to modifi cations, 
the amount of corrective coeffi cients for 
buildings and land may vary. The municipality 
may set the municipal coeffi cient at 1.5 and 
burden essentially only non-residents of the 
municipality. Indeed, it applies to buildings used 
for family recreation, garages and buildings for 
business. The advantage of this coeffi cient is 
that it does not burden buildings for permanent 
housing, and vice versa, the disadvantage is 
that a municipality cannot infl uence its amount. 
The municipality can set the local coeffi cient at 
two, three, four and fi ve. The entire calculated 
tax obligation is multiplied by this coeffi cient, 
except for some land (arable land, grassland).
Tax revenues on immovable property have 
had a growing trend since 1993. This trend 
is infl uenced by many factors, for example, 
since 2001, by the improvement of the state 
of registration in the Land Registry and 
Fig. 1: The development of the tax revenue from immovable property in the Czech Republic
Source: Tax administration (2015), own processing
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transparency of ownership relations and by 
streamlining control and search operations of 
local fi nancial authorities. The most signifi cant 
factor, however, are legislative changes. 
In 2009, the exemption from completed 
constructions of residential houses and 
buildings, where insulation was carried out, was 
abolished, along with introducing the possibility 
of setting the local coeffi cient. Another major 
change that affected the tax yield on immovable 
property was the increase in tax rates from 2010 
onwards. The reduction of the tax revenues in 
2011 occurred partly as a consequence of the 
increase in the volume of arrears, but also due 
to additional reductions and subsequent tax 
refunds for the previous tax year as a result of 
court decisions. The gradual precision of legal 
norms had also a positive impact on increasing 
tax yields on immovable property.
2. Position of the Regions of the 
Czech Republic in the Context of 
Tax Yields on Immovable Property
In the Czech Republic there are fourteen local 
self-governing units, these are 13 regions and 
the capital Prague, not an independent region, 
however, has the same powers as a region. 
There are many geographic, demographic and 
socio-economic disparities among individual 
regions.
As seen from the graph (Fig. 2), in terms of 
the area and population the Central Bohemian 
Region is the largest. The lowest population is 
in the Karlovy Vary Region, which is also the 
second smallest by area. Large differences 
between regions are also in population density, 
which is the highest in the Moravian-Silesian 
Region (224 inhabitants per m2). On the 
contrary, the lowest density of population is in the 
South Bohemian Region, which is the second 
largest by area. The Capital City of Prague 
shows a specifi c position among the regions, 
which has a small area but a large number of 
inhabitants (12% of the total population in the 
Czech Republic) and thanks to it, it is a place 
with the highest population density, which is 
2,555 people per m2.
A tax imposed in individual regions (Fig. 3) 
shows a similar trend as tax revenues on 
immovable property in Fig. 1. The tax imposed 
is growing with a signifi cant increase between 
2009 and 2010, in connection with legislative 
changes in those years. The highest amounts 
of the tax imposed are in the Central Bohemian 
Region, the South Moravian Region and 
Moravian-Silesian Region, while the lowest are 
in the Karlovy Vary Region.
As it can be seen from Tab. 1 the 
comparison of the regions in terms of taxes 
on immovable property is signifi cantly different 
when compared by area and population. The 
highest amount of taxes per 1 ha is in Prague 
and in the Moravian-Silesian Region and 
in the Usti Region. These are the industrial 
Fig. 2: The size of local self-governing units in terms of the area and population (in %)
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2016), own calculation
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regions. According to the amount of taxes per 
1 inhabitant the highest amount of taxes is in 
the Central Bohemian Region, the Karlovy 
Vary Region and the Usti Region. In contrast, 
absolutely the lowest property tax per capita 
is in Prague. It is the largest city in the Czech 
Republic, which has namely the highest 
corrective coeffi cient according to population; 
on the other hand, Prague has not introduced 
the local coeffi cient. 
3. Goal and Methods
The primary objective of the research is to 
determine the use of legislative instruments, 
Fig. 3: The development of the tax imposed of immovable property 2005-2014 (in thousands CZK)
Source: Tax administration (2015), own processing
Tax imposed Tax imposed per 1 ha Tax imposed per 1 inhabitant
Prague 779,024 15,701 623
Central Bohemian 1,473,171 1,337 1,125
South Bohemian 678,594 675 1,065
Plzeň 542,278 717 945
Karlovy Vary 338,402 1,021 1,128
Ústí 923,401 1,731 1,120
Liberec 428,501 1,355 977
Hradec Králové 610,450 1,283 1,106
Pardubice 527,293 1,167 1,022
Vysočina 520,384 766 1,020
South Moravian 986,112 1,371 842
Olomouc 579,394 1,100 911
Moravian-Silesian 977,706 1,802 802
Zlín 463,443 1,169 791
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2016), Tax administration (2015), own calculation
Tab. 1: The comparison of regions in terms of the tax imposed in 2014 (in thousands CZK)
EM_4_2017.indd   123 13.12.2017   12:53:46
124 2017, XX, 4
Finance
leading to an increase in tax revenues from 
immovable property in the regions of the 
Czech Republic. Access of municipalities to 
the increase in the tax revenues on immovable 
property is then studied through coeffi cients 
within the Moravian-Silesian Region. Using 
a questionnaire survey the use of individual 
coeffi cients and reasons, leading municipalities 
to their implementation, modifi cation or cancella-
tion are examined. This research closely follows 
up on the research of the use of local coeffi cients, 
which was carried out in 2014 and 2015.
In the article, there is also a description 
of the immovable property tax development 
in the Czech Republic based on time series 
of the tax imposed in response to legislative 
changes. The dynamics of the time series was 
investigated using a growth rate that was in the 
year t calculated according to formula (1):
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where yt is the value of the immovable property 
of the tax imposed in the year t, yt-1 is the value 
of the immovable property tax imposed in the 
year t-1.
The tax imposed represents the amount of 
tax as reported in tax returns and yield (Y) is 
calculated according to formula (2):
Y =       * 100 TRTI
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where TR is tax revenue, TI is tax imposed.
By using the chi-square test it was verifi ed 
whether the municipality location in the 
district infl uenced its decision on assessing or 
modifying coeffi cients.
A contingency table was created, based 
on observed and expected frequencies, which 
were calculated according to the following 
formula (3):
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where ni is the sum of individual lines, nj is the 
sum of individual columns in the contingency 
table, n is the sum of all observed frequencies.
The test criterion was calculated using the 
formula (4): 
 
(4)
where s means the number of categories of 
a monitored variable.
Critical value K = χ
α
(s–1) of chi-squared 
distribution with a degree of freedom df = s-1 
was calculated using Excel and the function 
CHIINV (α; df) for the given level of signifi cance 
α 0.05 (Ramík & Perzina, 2014). To verify the 
accuracy, signifi cance (p-value) was calculated 
and was compared with the chosen signifi cance 
level (α = 0.05). The function CHIDIST (T; df) 
was used for the p-value calculation.
Methodically, the research relies on the 
evaluation of secondary statistical data of 
the Czech Statistical Offi ce and the General 
Financial Directorate of the Czech Republic. 
The paper used the results of primary research 
focused on the application of the coeffi cients 
by municipalities of the Moravian-Silesian 
Region, which was implemented in 2016, by 
a questionnaire through personal interviews, 
email or telephone.
4. Results and Discussion
As it is evident from the data in Tab. 2, the 
growth rate in 2009 in all local self-governing 
units is greater than one, as a result of the 
possibility of introducing a local coeffi cient, 
which could be just used for the fi rst time in 
this year. 389 municipalities introduced the 
local coeffi cient, which accounts for 6.22% of 
the total number of municipalities in the Czech 
Republic. In 2010, the growth rate is again 
high and it is even higher than 1.5 in some 
regions and in Prague. This fact is infl uenced 
by doubling the basic rate of tax on all land, 
buildings and units (excluding agricultural land 
and buildings for other business activities). 
Increasing tax rates led some municipalities to 
cancel the local coeffi cient (it was the case of 
about 189 municipalities), other municipalities 
introduced it newly in 2010 (83 municipalities). 
Given that the various local self-governing 
units have different areas, types of land and 
buildings, the impact of the increase in tax rates 
is different, too.
As already mentioned in the beginning, the 
structure of fi nancial resources of municipalities 
is diverse and consists of tax and non-tax 
revenues. Tax revenues are critical for municipal 
budgets and taxes are made up of shared and 
ij
  3, .., n
EM_4_2017.indd   124 13.12.2017   12:53:46
1254, XX, 2017
Finance
assigned taxes. Revenues on shared taxes 
are transferred to municipal budgets under the 
Act on budgetary allocation of taxes and the 
municipality has no possibility to infl uence their 
amount.
The assigned tax, i.e. a tax on immovable 
property in the Czech Republic can respond to 
the actual costs of the municipality. The amount 
of tax revenues on immovable property within 
the local self-governing units is signifi cantly 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Prague 1.04 1.01 1.09 1.01 1.54 1.02 1.05 1.02 1.02
Central Bohemian 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.23 1.37 1.01 1.17 1.02 0.99
South Bohemian 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.27 1.42 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.01
Plzeň 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.18 1.38 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.01
Karlovy Vary 1.03 0.99 1.03 1.44 1.54 0.99 1.05 1.02 1.02
Ústí 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.53 1.13 1.05 1.15 1.06 0.98
Liberec 0.99 1.02 1.00 1.49 1.26 0.99 1.29 1.01 1.00
Hradec Králové 1.02 1.00 0.98 1.42 1.33 1.01 1.06 1.02 0.98
Pardubice 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.36 1.33 1.03 1.08 0.96 1.01
Vysočina 1.01 1.01 0.99 1.35 1.24 1.01 1.07 1.00 1.00
South Moravian 1.02 1.02 0.97 1.11 1.37 1.02 1.05 1.04 1.00
Olomouc 1.01 0.96 1.08 1.09 1.56 0.86 1.08 1.01 1.00
Moravian-Silesian 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.16 1.48 0.95 1.18 1.12 0.98
Zlín 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.07 1.39 1.04 1.16 1.01 1.00
Source: own calculation
Tab. 2: The development of the coeffi cient growth of the tax imposed
Fig. 4: The development of the use and modifi cations of coeffi cients by municipalities in individual regions (in %) in 2015
Source: own calculation
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infl uenced by the decision of individual 
municipalities on introducing or modifying 
coeffi cients. The following graph (Fig. 4) 
specifi es the percentage use of coeffi cients in 
individual regions. Due to differences in the 
number of municipalities in the regions, the 
percentage use was compared.
From Fig. 4, it is clear that the municipal 
coeffi cient is most used. This coeffi cient applies 
to buildings for family recreation and for buildings 
used for business. Therefore, a coeffi cient does 
not burden the residents of the municipality. In the 
Central Bohemian Region, the Liberec Region 
and the Usti Region this possibility is used by 
more than 30% of the municipalities. The use 
of the modifi cation of corrective coeffi cients is 
low (in the Czech Republic the average use 
is 6.4%). There are not enormous differences 
among regions and rather modifi cations are used 
to differentiate various parts of the municipality. 
The modifi cation is most used by municipalities 
in the Usti Region. The local coeffi cient can be 
considered the most effective tool, by which the 
municipality as a recipient of tax can signifi cantly 
increase the tax revenue on property on its 
territory, and it is used by an average of 8.3%, 
and municipalities in the Karlovy Vary Region 
use it most. In that region, more than a quarter of 
municipalities have adopted a similar strategy and 
some of them have introduced a local coeffi cient 
since 2009 and have used it up to the present.
4.1 The Form of Fiscal Autonomy in the 
Moravian-Silesian Region
Subsequent research aims to identify and 
evaluate the regional context of the activities of 
municipalities in the Moravian-Silesian Region 
in connection with infl uencing tax revenues 
on immovable property. In the following graph 
(Fig. 5) the distribution of municipalities in 
the Moravian-Silesian Region by population 
is shown. Size groups are determined by 
population for applying the corrective coeffi cient 
for calculating the tax on immovable property.
In the Moravian-Silesian Region, there 
are 300 municipalities. Of these only 109 
municipalities (Fig. 6) use the determination 
or the modifi cation of coeffi cients for 
infl uencing the tax revenues on immovable 
property. Municipalities may introduce or 
modify the amount of the three coeffi cients. 
Most municipalities use only the modifi cation 
of just one coeffi cient. The decrease in the 
corrective coeffi cient is used least, and only by 
8 municipalities. A combination of introducing 
the municipal coeffi cient is inspirational, while 
reducing corrective coeffi cients. This fact 
has been detected only in 5 cases, though. 
This approach can be observed especially in 
municipalities that want to provide the required 
tax yields especially from other entities other 
than its own citizens.
Fig. 5: The distribution of municipalities in the Moravian-Silesian Region by size groups
Source: Czech Statistical Offi ce (2016), own calculation
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4.2 The Results of Empirical Research 
and Discussion
The research is focused on exploring the use of 
coeffi cients of the tax on immovable property by 
individual municipalities and was conducted by 
questioning. The research instrument involved 
a questionnaire, which included both closed-
ended and open-ended questions, in which 
the respondent was not submitted response 
options, and the respondent answered in his/
her words. The responses were then grouped 
according to semantic categories.
This is a local research, which focuses on the 
Moravian-Silesian Region. The region has a total 
of 300 municipalities, and 250 of them were 
addressed. 100 questionnaires were placed into 
processing and the response rate was 40%.
The structure of respondents (municipalities) 
by size is shown in the following Fig. 7. The 
graph shows that most respondents are formed 
by municipalities with a population of 1,001 
to 6,000. The structure of the respondents 
is infl uenced by a low response rate of 
questionnaires in the smallest municipalities 
with a population of up to 1,000.
Fig. 6: The use of coeffi cients by municipalities in the Moravian Silesian Region
Source: own calculation
Fig. 7: The structure of respondents by size of the municipality
Source: own calculation
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The structure of the respondents in terms 
of districts in the Moravian-Silesian Region is 
shown in Fig. 8. A small number of respondents 
in districts with a large number of municipalities 
is, among others, infl uenced by a varying 
size structure of municipalities, where for 
example in the Bruntál district there are 78% 
of municipalities with a population up to 1,000 
and, for instance, in the Karvina district there is 
not any such a small municipality.
4.3 Motivation for Introducing the 
Coeffi cients by the Municipalities 
of the Moravian-Silesian Region
The reasons which led the municipalities to the 
introduction of coeffi cients were determined 
by using open-ended questions and then were 
grouped into semantic categories.
As it is evident from Fig. 9 above the most 
common reason that motivated municipalities to 
introduce municipal coeffi cients was to increase 
Fig. 8: The structure of respondents by districts
Source: own calculation
Fig. 9: Motivation for introducing municipal coeffi cients
Source: own calculation
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the revenue of the municipality. By determining 
municipal coeffi cients some municipalities 
wanted to increase the taxation of buildings for 
family recreation or for business. The increase 
in this tax liability thus does affect the population 
of the given municipality. In determining this 
coeffi cient, municipalities cannot choose its 
amount, but they can specify to which types 
of buildings (except buildings for permanent 
housing) the coeffi cient will apply. There were also 
reasons from which an insuffi cient orientation in 
the fi eld of the tax on immovable property could 
be inferred, for instance, the coeffi cient was set 
by another mayor then they do not know the 
reasons or the coeffi cient was set at the request 
of tax authorities. If the municipalities stated 
that the reason for setting the coeffi cient was 
to increase the revenue of the municipality for 
a specifi ed purpose, the most often mentioned 
were: the beautifi cation of municipal areas, 
covering the costs of the cleanliness of the 
municipality, covering the costs of sewerage, 
fl ood protection measurements, health, sport 
and culture. The municipal coeffi cient was 
introduced in 28 municipalities surveyed.
Corrective coeffi cients are determined 
by law, and as mentioned above, they can 
be modifi ed differently for land and buildings 
through their increase or decrease. The 
corrective coeffi cient for land was modifi ed by 
18 municipalities and by 17 municipalities for 
buildings.
When modifying corrective coeffi cients for 
land a different objective is usually pursued than 
to increase the revenue of the municipality. Most 
often, this coeffi cient is used to differentiate 
the various parts of the municipality according 
to infrastructure and attractiveness as it does 
not have to be set for the whole territory of the 
municipality at the same level (Fig. 10). An 
interesting reason is to increase the coeffi cient 
as an incentive to shorten the building period, 
because then the building will be taxed by using 
the corrective coeffi cient for buildings, which is 
lower. On the other hand, municipalities can 
benefi t from a reduction in corrective coeffi cients 
for the reason of supporting the new building in 
the selected location.
Similarly, a different objective is pursued 
than to increase the revenue of the municipality 
while reasoning for the modifi cation of 
corrective coeffi cients for buildings. This 
coeffi cient is used to differentiate the 
various parts of the municipality according 
to infrastructure, attractiveness, amenities 
and access to employment. The reduction 
of corrective coeffi cients is also used in parts 
of the municipalities that are affected by the 
negative impact of transport or mining activities 
(see Fig. 11).
The local coeffi cient was set by 18 
respondents and half of them had it already 
Fig. 10: Motivation for modifying corrective coeffi cients for land
Source: own calculation
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introduced in 2009. The prevailing local 
coeffi cient rate is above 2 (a total of 12 
municipalities), the amount of the coeffi cient 
is generally most frequently used also in the 
Czech Republic. Unlike other coeffi cients, the 
most common reason for introducing the local 
coeffi cient is generally to increase the revenue 
in the municipal budget. Or the revenue is used 
for specifi c investment needs of municipalities 
such as sewer construction. The increase in tax 
yields occurs in municipalities that are industrial 
and on whose territory large entrepreneurial 
businesses have their property. As found most 
municipalities have higher costs associated with 
the maintenance of the cadastral area, which 
is mortgaged property owned by business 
entities. Municipalities also want to motivate 
fi rms through coeffi cients for the better use 
of property on the territory of the municipality 
with the aim of securing new jobs, especially 
for the citizens of the municipality. These are 
often the buildings of companies that have 
their headquarters outside the municipality 
(especially in large cities such as Prague and 
Brno) and therefore assigned taxes fl ow into 
the budgets of other towns.
In the context of municipalities with a high 
population growth and increased construction, 
there is also an increase in the costs of 
installation of utilities, public lighting, radio, 
and maintenance of local roads, which also 
encourages municipalities to introduce local 
coeffi cients. Municipalities that are recreational 
areas with sports and recreational facilities also 
introduce local coeffi cients for increasing the 
revenue, and the increased tax is compensated 
to the citizens of the municipality, for example, 
by reducing or abolishing certain fees (e.g. 
waste disposal) and thus the municipality also 
reduces the administrative burden in connection 
with the collection of these fees.
Based on questionnaires reasons were 
also identifi ed why municipalities do not use 
the possibility of introducing coeffi cients. One 
of the reasons, is, for instance, a low number 
of inhabitants in the municipality, or a small 
increase in the revenue of the municipality at 
the expense of the high fi nancial burden on 
citizens.
4.4 The Effect of the Municipality 
Location on Researched 
Phenomena
By using the chi-square test it was verifi ed 
whether the municipality location in the district 
infl uenced its decision on assessing or modifying 
coeffi cients. A zero hypothesis H0 was set: 
Determining or modifying coeffi cients 
do not depend on the municipality location.
Based on the results in the above table 
(Tab. 3) we can say that we shall reject the 
null hypothesis. The decision on introducing 
or modifying coeffi cients depends on the 
municipality localization. There are signifi cant 
differences between the municipalities, which 
Fig. 11: Motivation for modifying corrective coeffi cients for buildings
Source: own calculation
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are located in different districts of the Moravian-
Silesian Region, such as municipalities 
in Opava, which do not use the option of 
determining the local coeffi cient.
As shown in Tab. 4 the percentage 
of municipalities that use the coeffi cients 
in the individual districts is very different. 
Municipalities on average at 36% in the 
Moravian-Silesian Region use the coeffi cients; 
municipalities in the districts of Bruntál, 
Nový Jičín and Opava are below average. 
Conversely, a higher percentage is the districts 
of Frýdek-Místek, Karviná and Ostrava-město. 
There can also be monitored the link between 
the size of municipalities, as in all three 
districts using coeffi cients to a greater extent, 
larger municipalities of over 1,000 inhabitants 
predominate.
Conclusion
Fiscal decentralization in the context of the 
reallocation of public resources is a complex 
and multi-faceted process, which fosters 
social priorities and strategies. Local taxes 
and especially the tax on immovable property 
is considered the most apposite municipal 
tax. However, a number of contentious issues 
are associated with this tax in the context 
of valuation, assessment of the tax rate or 
controversy if the property should be taxed at 
all, in spite of it, the taxation revenue of the 
of immovable property fi lls municipal budgets 
more or less in all European Union countries.
Municipalities in the Czech Republic have 
the ability to affect tax revenues on immovable 
property through coeffi cients thus being the 
only assigned tax. As found in the carried out 
analyses, the possibility of modifying coeffi cients 
for increasing the revenue is still underused by 
municipalities. E.g., the introduction of the local 
coeffi cient is still postponed by almost 92% of 
the municipalities in the Czech Republic, either 
due to concerns of inhabitants about raising 
taxes or as a result of insuffi cient orientation of 
the municipal council in the given fi eld.
It was found that the municipal coeffi cient 
is most used, whose determination is the 
simplest and does not burden the residents of 
the given municipality. The use of modifi cations 
of corrective coeffi cients is low and it is used 
only by 6.4% of the municipalities in the Czech 
Republic, although there are large differences 
CHI-SQUARE 12.6643
alfa 0.05
df 5
CHINV 11.0705
CHIDIST 0.0267
Source: own calculation
Municipality Use of coeffi cients Municipalities of lower 1,000 inhabitants
Bruntál 28 78
Frýdek-Místek 50 40
Karviná 47 0
Nový Jičín 30 48
Opava 30 47
Ostrava-město 54 31
Moravian-Silesian Region 36 49
Source: own calculation
Tab. 3: Verifi cation of the hypothesis H0
Tab. 4: The use of coeffi cients according to districts in the Moravian-Silesian Region (in %)
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between regions. The local coeffi cient that 
can be considered the most effective tool by 
which the municipality as a recipient of tax 
can signifi cantly increase the tax revenue on 
immovable property on its territory is used 
by an average of 8.3% of municipalities, and 
municipalities in the Karlovy Vary Region use 
it most.
The Moravian-Silesian region is among the 
regions with higher tax revenues on immovable 
property. It is largely due to its industrial 
character. Analyses made suggests that 
even here there is certainly the possibility for 
increasing municipal budgets through the tax 
revenue on immovable property by increasing 
or modifying coeffi cients.
As the primary research revealed 
(conducted in the years 2014-2016) motivation 
to use coeffi cients to increase tax yields on 
immovable property is different. They differ 
mainly in relation to the specifi c application 
of the individual coeffi cients. Differences also 
result from the structure of buildings and land 
on the territory of the municipality and the way 
they are used. Some municipalities introduce 
coeffi cients to increase the taxation of buildings 
for family recreation, while others want to 
burden buildings for business by a higher tax.
It was found that taxpayers when providing 
transparency of the use of the revenues do not 
negatively perceive the higher tax burden, 
particularly in smaller municipalities. Thus, 
the principle of subsidiarity is fulfi lled, where 
decision-making and accountability in public 
affairs, takes place at the lowest level of public 
administration being closest to citizens. It is 
therefore in the interest of the municipality to 
explain to taxpayers what consideration is 
granted, not only by public lighting infrastructure 
facilities, protection of property or an increase 
in property values, but municipalities fi nance 
e.g. schools, kindergartens, subsidize public 
transport (Janoušková & Sobotovičová, 2016b). 
This leads to increased political accountability, 
thanks to the proximity of voters.
Even though tax revenues on immovable 
property have had a growing trend since 1993, 
the Czech Republic is still among the countries 
with the lowest share of taxes in total tax 
revenues in EU countries. It is mainly due to the 
structure of the tax base and the assessment 
of the tax base is subject to criticism, which is 
not based on property value refl ecting infl ation. 
Problems concerning income and expenditure 
balancing arise in municipalities, as public 
expenditure is subject to infl ation.
This paper was supported by the Ministry 
of Education, Youth and Sports Czech Republic 
within the Institutional Support for Long-term 
Development of a Research Organization in 
2017.
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Abstract
PROPERTY TAX IN THE REGIONS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Jana Janoušková, Šárka Sobotovičová
Fiscal decentralization in the context of the reallocation of public resources is a complex and multi-
faceted process, which fosters social priorities and strategies. The main objective is to increase 
the self-reliance and self-suffi ciency of municipalities related to allocation effi ciency and possible 
adjustment to the local conditions. The municipalities in the Czech Republic have the possibility 
to affect the tax revenue on immovable property by means of the coeffi cients being thus the only 
assigned tax. The aim of the paper is to determine the use of legislative tools to increase the tax 
revenue on immovable property in the regions of the Czech Republic. Access of municipalities to 
the increase in the tax revenues on immovable property is then studied through three coeffi cients 
within the Moravian-Silesian Region. Examples of good practice in motivating municipalities 
to implement or modify selected coeffi cients leading to an increase in municipal budgets are 
examined. The article also performs a description of the development of the tax on immovable 
property in the Czech Republic, on the basis of the time series of tax imposed as a follow-up to 
the legislative changes. Methodically the research relies on the evaluation of secondary statistical 
data of the Czech Statistical Offi ce and Financial Administration of the Czech Republic, and the 
primary research that was implemented in 2016 focuses on the application of the coeffi cients by 
municipalities of the Moravian-Silesian Region. This research closely follows up on the research of 
the use of local coeffi cients, which was carried out in 2014 and 2015.
Key Words: Fiscal decentralization, tax autonomy, immovable property tax, regions, Moravian-
Silesian Region.
JEL Classifi cation: H70, H71.
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